Verisim: Formal Analysis of Network Simulations

Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Carl A. Gunter, Senior Member, IEEE, Moonjoo Kim, Insup Lee, Fellow, IEEE, Davor Obradovic, Oleg Sokolsky, and Mahesh Viswanathan

Abstract—Network protocols are often analyzed using simulations. We demonstrate how to extend such simulations to check propositions expressing safety properties of network event traces in an extended form of linear temporal logic. Our technique uses the NS simulator together with a component of the MaC system to provide a uniform framework. We demonstrate its effectiveness by analyzing simulations of the Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol for packet radio networks. Our analysis finds violations of significant properties and we discuss the faults that cause them. Novel aspects of our approach include modest integration costs with other simulation objectives such as performance evaluation, greatly increased flexibility in specifying properties to be checked and techniques for analyzing complex traces of alarms raised by the monitoring software.

Index Terms—Verisim, formal analysis, network, simulation, testing, routing, NS, MaC, AODV, temporal logic, ad hoc networks, packet radio, tuning, population abstraction, packet-type abstraction.

1 INTRODUCTION

Network protocols such as routing protocols are difficult to test because meaningful experiments may involve dozens or even thousands of hosts and routers. Developing an adequate testbed would be prohibitively expensive while experiments involving operational systems may be too risky or inconvenient. Thus, simulations are widely used as a testing technique for both performance and correctness properties.

The need for validating protocol implementations in simulators has been well recognized. Not only could an improper implementation of the given protocol lead to incorrect simulation results, but, if it becomes a part of the simulation suite, it could lead to incorrect results for other protocols simulated with it. Network simulators come with validation test suites for most of the core protocols, so that modified versions of these protocols can be validated to have the same properties. These tests compare the performance of a modified protocol with a precomputed expected performance chart for the scenario.

There are at least three ways in which testing based only on performance measures is less than one would like for careful analysis of a protocol: Such an analysis may not be able to detect certain kinds of bugs in the simulator code, it is desirable to have more support for finding flaws in the protocol itself, and there are flaws of interest that are not immediately manifested as performance problems. Let us consider each of these briefly.

Simulator code can be buggy. An inherent assumption in the validation tests is that any significant bug will show up as a performance degradation, but this need not be true. In particular, a bug may simply alter the overall performance profile. If the aim of the simulation is to find the right parameters to include in the standard specification of the protocol, these parameters may be incorrect because they were learned from a simulation that was incorrectly coded. In particular, there may be poorer-than-expected performance from a deployed system if it implements the protocol properly. Assuming this is even discovered, it may be very painful to reconcile the differences and find the proper parameters, especially if they have been set in stone by the standard.

Suppose the protocol has a design flaw that causes bad performance figures during simulation. The performance figures alone may give only limited information about the nature of the flaw. For a complex protocol that interacts with many other protocols, fuller diagnostic information would be invaluable. Current practice involves searching for the flaw by repeated runs of the simulation as informed by manual inspection of the packet trace or processing by ad hoc shell scripts. A structured, logical framework for discovering these flaws can facilitate such interactive discovery.

There are some properties of protocols that do not relate directly to performance. Suppose that a routing protocol also has a security requirement that a packet at a node \( n_1 \) meant for a neighboring node \( n_2 \) will never be seen by a third node \( n_3 \). If this property is violated, the hit on performance is likely to be very small, but one would still...
like to know if the property is violated in any of the simulated scenarios. Even if one is only concerned with performance, there are correctness properties that will impact performance in important circumstances. It may be easier to find these flaws by searching for non-performance-affecting violations rather than by creating scenarios in which these flaws actually cause performance problems. For instance, routing loops can degrade performance, but may also occur without significant impact on performance. Since they are not expected to happen, their occurrence in a simulation would be of interest, even if they did not impact performance in that particular scenario.

In this paper, we describe a tool suite called Verisim which facilitates the analysis of correctness properties in network simulations. The advantage of Verisim comes from its combination of a popular network simulator tool, NS [13], with the flexible trace-checking component of the MaC system [17]. Traces are generated using NS (version 2) and analyzed to determine whether they satisfy desired properties. These properties are expressed using the Meta-Event Definition Language (MEDL) used in MaC. MEDL is an expressive language extending Linear Temporal Logic; it is able to express a variety of important safety properties of the kind network software is expected to satisfy. With this combination, it is possible to seamlessly integrate flexible testing of such properties into the processes generally used to design and analyze network systems.

We provide an overview of the MaC framework for system analysis, describe its instantiation in Verisim and illustrate the application of Verisim to existing simulation code for Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector routing (AODV), a protocol for routing in ad hoc packet radio networks. Our case study has two parts based on code we obtained from the Monarch Group at Carnegie-Mellon University. The first part illustrates a basic approach for using Verisim to find and correct bugs in the simulation code, the second part shows how the flexibility of Verisim can reduce turn-around time in debugging.

In the first part of our case study, we run an NS simulation and create a trace T which is analyzed for properties AODV is expected to satisfy. The properties are expressed by a MEDL formula \( \phi \) and the checker produces as its output a metatrace \( T^\phi \) of alarms indicating violations of \( \phi \) by the given trace. Our study revealed several bugs in the simulation code and we use Verisim to locate each of these and carry out regression testing until they are all removed. The technique is what we call Repair First Bug (RFB). RFB proceeds by taking the trace and analyzing the first alarm to determine what may have caused it. Assuming that the formula \( \phi \) is properly expressed, this represents a bug in the simulation code. This bug is repaired and the newly modified program \( P_1 \) is again run through the simulation to produce an output trace \( T_1 \), which is again examined to find a second bug. Assuming that three bugs are found, this process generates a program \( P_3 \) which satisfies the property \( \phi \) in the tested scenario. In all, this debugging session required three runs of the simulation.

In the second part of our case study, we illustrate how the flexibility of Verisim can be exploited to improve turn-around time for debugging. In this study, we attempt to avoid some steps where the simulation was rerun to generate a new trace for continued debugging. The situation is similar to what one sees in compilers, where an effort is made to produce error messages that are as independent as possible in hope that the several faults in the program can be removed before the compilation needs to be repeated. This is especially useful for simulations, which may run for long periods of time (even days) and where analysis may generate vast, incomprehensible metatrace of alarms. Alarms represent bugs that must be repaired and it is necessary to repair as many as possible before rerunning the simulation. The automated techniques used by compilers are largely inapplicable since errors generated by routing protocols are quite different in nature. We focus on a mixture of manual and automated techniques we call tuning. The metatrace \( T^\psi \) is manually inspected to find bug classes and then the MEDL property \( \phi \) is modified or “tuned” to produce a formula \( \psi \) that ignores one or more bugs recognized in this first manual analysis. Verisim then reanalyzes the original \( T \) to produce a new metatrace \( T^\psi \), which is inspected for new bugs. Note that, the second step can proceed without rerunning the simulation. This strategy is repeatedly applied until it becomes desirable to fix a collection of bugs and rerun the simulation.

The paper is divided into seven sections. After this introduction, we describe Verisim and its components, the MaC framework, and the NS system. Then, in the third section, we describe the AODV protocol. Simulator code for this protocol is then analyzed in two case studies in the fourth section. The fifth section describes abstraction techniques that can be used to improve the scalability of checking. The sixth section discusses some of the related work and the seventh section concludes the paper.

2 Verisim

The need to analyze protocol simulation results beyond performance measures led us to design an integrated environment for protocol simulation and analysis. The environment, which we call Verisim, enables us to perform simulations and explore their properties within the same framework. Rather than developing Verisim components from scratch, we envisioned Verisim as a collection of tools that have been tried by researchers and developers and proven to be useful in similar contexts.

We designed Verisim within the MaC monitoring and checking framework [18]. The MaC framework appeared to be a natural choice for the toolset architecture. MaC is designed for the formal analysis of trace-based executions with respect to user-specified properties. This setup exactly matches our needs regarding simulation trace analysis. We designed Verisim as an integrated system that combines the network simulator NS [13] and the checker from an earlier MaC-based monitoring system for Java programs [17]. The individual tools are described below. A simulation trace produced by NS is automatically transformed into the input format of the MaC checker. The resulting toolset provides the instantiation of the MaC framework depicted in Fig. 1. The resulting integrated system enables flexible formal analysis of network simulations where properties are expressed in MEDL, the input language of MaC based on temporal logic, and checked on traces produced by NS.
The use of MEDL allows the users writing a property to be checked to concentrate on what needs to be checked rather than how to check it. We note that, for simple properties, an ad hoc implementation of the checker—say, as a Perl script—may be easy to write and faster than a general-purpose checker. However, the checking algorithm will have to be implemented anew for every property one wants to check and, as properties become more complex, ad hoc checkers become more and more error-prone.

2.1 NS Network Simulations

Simulator implementations of protocols under development can provide an idea of how the protocols behave in a wide variety of network environments. Typically, a protocol and a suite of scenarios can be generated quickly and the simulation result is then provided as a feedback to the protocol designer. As such, simulator traces often reveal design flaws and potential improvements in the protocol before a laboratory testbed is even considered. Moreover, the simulator code often serves as a reference implementation for the protocol.

The development of a custom simulation framework for a single protocol allows the designer to investigate small topologies and basic characteristics of a new protocol. However, such simulations are limited in their ability to provide data about how a protocol interacts in the larger, multiprotocol environments where it must eventually operate. An extensible, multiprotocol simulation framework allows protocol designers to layer their protocol implementation at the node level and analyze its performance and interaction with other protocols. NS [13] is a discrete event network simulator developed by the VINT Project (http://netweb.usc.edu/vint), a collaboration between UC Berkeley, LBL, USC/ISI, and Xerox PARC, that provides such a framework. The system we study in this paper is based on NS and our case studies use an extension of it by the CMU Monarch group (http://monarch.cs.cmu.edu) that adds link-layer and physical layer support for wireless networks.

A block diagram showing the steps in an NS simulation is shown in Fig. 2. In order to carry out simulations using NS, one first implements the protocol in C++ using a collection of simulator constructs. A number of well-known protocols have been implemented for NS and can be used in simulations of newer protocols. For instance, the NS release provides TCP, UDP, IP, and various routing protocols. These protocols are typically implemented as vertical layers on a node. New protocols may be implemented on top of or in between such preexisting layers. Next, one needs to generate a simulation scenario written as a script. A typical NS scenario consists of a dynamic topology description, a traffic model, and various protocol configuration parameters. The simulator is then compiled with the protocol code and the scenario to produce a protocol-specific simulator. When the simulator is executed, a network model is constructed from the scenario topology, while data sources and sinks are added according to the traffic model. Protocol agents are attached to nodes in the network and their behavior is simulated. The result is a trace of all the packets produced, transported, dropped in the network, and any other diagnostic information directly instrumented into the protocol simulator code. This trace is typically used...
to analyze the performance of the protocol in terms of metrics like end-to-end delay, queue lengths, bandwidth, network throughput, and goodput. It can also be fed into a visualization tool to help understand the network scenario and protocol response.

### 2.2 MaC Monitoring and Checking

**Monitoring and Checking (MaC)** is a framework for dynamic analysis of safety properties of systems with a trace-based semantics. The overall framework is depicted in Fig. 3. The framework includes two main phases: 1) Before the system is run, its requirement and implementation specification are used to generate runtime monitoring components; 2) during system execution, information about the running system is collected and matched against the requirements.

A major task in the first phase is to specify requirements formally. In addition, a user identifies aspects of the program execution that must be observed and reported in the trace, so that the desired properties may be checked. This is specified in what we call the *monitoring script*. The primary reason for having a separate monitoring script and requirement specification, is to separate implementation-specific details of monitoring from requirements specification. This separation helps in extending the framework for different implementation languages and specification formalisms, while providing a clean interface to the designer of monitors. In the first phase, runtime components of the MaC framework are generated from a requirement specification and monitoring script automatically, the monitoring script generates a monitor, and the requirement specification generates a checker.

The runtime architecture of the MaC framework consists of a *monitor* and a *checker* [17], [18]. The monitor observes the running program and generates a sequence of events which is then examined by the checker. The *metatrace*, which is generated by the checker, contains the timed sequence of properties that have been violated during the execution, along with additional information about the system state, which can then be used for the purposes of debugging. Previously, we developed an implementation of the MaC framework for monitoring and checking of Java programs, called Java-MaC.

Verisim uses the checker component of Java-MaC, while the monitor component of Java-MaC is replaced by NS. The checker is based on the *Meta Event Definition Language (MEDL)*, which is designed to express properties of traces. MEDL is an extension of linear temporal logic (LTL) that captures safety properties (see [25] for a precise characterization of MEDL’s expressive power). Safety properties [1] are requirements whose violation can be detected by examining a finite prefix of the execution. Any runtime checking of computation must make decisions about the validity or faultiness of a trace based on what it has seen so far; hence, safety properties are the class of properties that can be checked dynamically. MEDL also has additional variables that may be used to record certain aspects of the trace. These variables represent the checker’s state when trying to check if the trace conforms to the property. The presence of auxiliary variables in MEDL allows users to overcome certain well-known limitations in the expressive power of LTL. For example, within MEDL, one can “count” and, so, it is possible to express things like, “RREP should happen before the fifth occurrence of RREP.” As in SCR [14], we distinguish between two kinds of data that make up the trace of an execution: things that are true at some instant during the execution (which we call *events*) and facts that hold for a longer duration of time (which are called *conditions*). For example, the return from the method SendRequest occurs only at the instant when the control returns from the method, while a Boolean condition like, \((\text{next-hop}_a == 2)\) holds for as long as \(\text{next-hop}_a\) does not change its value from 2. The distinction between events and conditions is important in terms of what the checker can infer about the execution based on the information extracted by the monitor. The checker assumes that truth values of all conditions remain unchanged between updates from the monitor. For events, the checker makes the dual assumption, namely, that no events (of interest) happen between updates.

Based on this distinction between events and conditions, we have a simple two-sorted logic that constitutes MEDL. The syntax of conditions (C) and events (E) is given in Table 1. Here, \(e\) refers to primitive events that are reported in the trace by the monitor; \(c\) is either a primitive condition reported in the trace or a Boolean condition defined on the auxiliary variables. Guards (G) are used to update auxiliary variables that may record something about the history of the execution.

The models for this logic are similar to those for linear temporal logic, in that, they are sequences of worlds. The worlds correspond to instants in time at which we have information about the truth values of primitive conditions and events. Intuitively, these worlds correspond to the times when the monitor adds something to the trace. The intuition in describing the semantics of events and conditions based on such models is that conditions retain their truth values in the duration between two worlds, while events are present only at the instants corresponding to certain worlds. The labels on
the worlds give the truth values of primitive conditions and events. The semantics for negation ($\neg c$), conjunction ($c_1 \land c_2$), disjunction ($c_1 \lor c_2$), and implication ($c_1 \Rightarrow c_2$) of conditions is standard. Each condition is associated with two events, one that happens when the condition becomes true ($\text{start}(c)$) and the other that happens when the condition becomes false ($\text{end}(c)$). Conversely, occurrences of any two events $e_1$, $e_2$ define an interval of time and, thus, form a condition $[e_1, e_2)$ that is true from an occurrence of event $e_1$ until the first occurrence of $e_2$. The event $e$ when $c$ is true if $e$ occurs and condition $c$ is true at that time instant. Finally, a guard $e \Rightarrow stmt$ is executed when event $e$ is true; the effect of the execution is to update the values of the auxiliary variables according to the assignments given in $stmt$. In the assignments, we follow the common practice to denote by $x'$ the “next state” value of variable $x$. The formal semantics for the logic is given in [17], [18].

Primitive events sent by the checker may have values associated with them that give detailed information about the event. For example, an event that represents an update of a monitored variable will have the new value of the variable attached to it. The values may be used in assignments to auxiliary variables and event definitions.

Appendix A gives a complete MEDL script for some of the properties used in the Verisim analysis that we describe in subsequent sections. Here, we use it to illustrate the concrete syntax of MEDL. The script opens with a script name. The first section identifies primitive events and conditions that are sent to the checker by the monitor with the keyword $\text{import}$. For example, $\text{import event} ev$ $\text{event}$ $\text{ty}$ yields one primitive event, which represents the type of the simulation event in the example. The next section gives typed declarations of auxiliary variables. The declaration $\text{var int best_hc[at][dst]}$ introduces, for each pair of nodes $\text{at}$ and $\text{dst}$, a variable that represents the best known distance (hop count) between the nodes.

Further in the script, events and conditions are defined in terms of other events and conditions and the values of primitive events and auxiliary variables. For example, we represent an event that happens when a packet containing routing information about node dst is sent by node at as:

$$
event sendroute [at] [dst] =$$
$$routeinfo [at] [dst] when$$
$$((\text{value(eventty,0)} == 1)$$
$$\&\& (\text{value(src_hc,0)} < 255));$$

Here, $\text{routeinfo}$ is a previously defined event that occurs when routing information is present in a packet and the first value associated with the last occurrence of $\text{eventty}$ is 1, denoting a send event. Values of primitive events are accessed by their index, starting at 0. Finally, the script contains assignments to the auxiliary variables in response to events. For example, event $\text{init}$, which is the first event sent by the monitor, performs initialization of the checker state: $\text{init} \rightarrow \{ \text{best_hc[at][dst]}' = 0; \}$. The checker, which is generated automatically from the MEDL script evaluates the events and conditions described in the script whenever it reads an element from the trace. There can be dependencies between different events and conditions. For example, an event $e_1$ that is defined in terms of an auxiliary variable that is updated by event $e_2$, must be evaluated after $e_2$ and the variable have been updated. In order to evaluate events and conditions in a consistent order, we use a DAG data structure that implicitly encodes this dependency and has additional information that allows for fast evaluation of the events and conditions. A very important feature of our checking algorithm is that it evaluates events, conditions, and guards on a need basis. This is particularly useful when checking simulations of network protocols. The requirements for a network protocol typically impose constraints on every pair of nodes in the network. However, a simulation event, such as a packet arrival, affects only a few of the nodes and, thus, only a small subset of the constraints may be violated. The evaluation algorithm reevaluates only those events and condition that are affected by the incoming data.

The remainder of this paper deals with the validation of Verisim as a test harness for network simulations. To carry out this validation, we perform a case study based on a new protocol currently being standardized by IETF in the Manet Working Group. We present the protocol in the next section, along with some of the properties it is expected to satisfy. For this study, we selected simulation code written by the Monarch group at CMU, one of the research groups working on Manet protocols. As with any complex software, the version of the Monarch code we study has some bugs. We show how to find several of these using Verisim in a simulation of modest complexity.\footnote{We reported these bugs when we found them so they could be removed from subsequent versions of the Monarch simulator code.} Our first analysis focuses on the use of Verisim as a debugging aid, demonstrating the kinds of bugs that can be found. Our second study focuses on the strategy for using Verisim for debugging, focusing on efficient means for analyzing metatrace to find collections of independent bugs. The aim of the first study is to determine whether Verisim is useful while the aim of the second is to determine whether refinements in methodology can make it more useful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt;C&gt; ::= c</th>
<th>&lt;E&gt; ::= e</th>
<th>&lt;G&gt; ::= &lt;E&gt; -&gt; &lt;Statements&gt;</th>
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<tr>
<td>[ &lt;E&gt;, &lt;E&gt; )</td>
<td>start(&lt;C&gt;)</td>
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<td>! &lt;C&gt;</td>
<td>end(&lt;C&gt;)</td>
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<td>&lt;C&gt; &amp;&lt; &lt;C&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;E&gt; &amp;&lt; &lt;E&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&lt;C&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&lt;C&gt; =&gt; &lt;C&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;E&gt; when &lt;C&gt;</td>
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</table>
3 AODV Routing

This section describes the AODV routing protocol [21], [22] which we used in our case study. The first part provides a short description of the protocol. The second part discusses some of its requirements—properties that are expected to hold in AODV implementations.

3.1 AODV Protocol

The Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol is used in packet radio networks. A packet radio network consists of a collection of mobile nodes whose link connectivity frequently changes due to the node movement. Because of dynamic connectivity and a typically low link bandwidth, AODV establishes routes “on-demand” (that is, only when they are needed).

A route to a destination \( d \) contains the following fields:

- \( \text{next}_d \): Next node on a path to \( d \).
- \( \text{hops}_d \): Distance from \( d \), measured in the number of hops (hops) that need to be traversed to reach \( d \).
- \( \text{seq}_d \): Last recorded sequence number for \( d \).
- \( \text{lifetime}_d \): Remaining time before route expiration.

The purpose of sequence numbers is to track changes in topology. Each node maintains its own sequence number. It is incremented whenever the set of neighbors of the node changes. When a route is established, it is stamped with the current sequence number of its destination. As the topology changes, more recent routes will have larger sequence numbers. That way, nodes can distinguish between recent and obsolete routes.

When a node \( s \) wants to communicate with a destination \( d \), it broadcasts a route request (RREQ) message to all of its neighbors. The message has the following format:

\[
\text{RREQ}(d, \text{hops}_s \rightarrow d, \text{dest}_s, \text{seq}_s) .
\]

Argument \( \text{hops}_s \rightarrow d \) determines the current distance from the node which initiated the route request. The initial RREQ has this field set to 0 and every subsequent node increments it by 1. Argument \( \text{dest}_s \) specifies the least sequence number for a route to \( d \) that \( s \) is willing to accept (\( s \) usually uses its own \( \text{seq}_s \) for this purpose). Argument \( \text{seq}_s \) is the sequence number of the initiating node.

When a node \( t \) receives a RREQ, it first checks whether it has a route to \( d \) stamped with a sequence number at least as big as \( \text{dest}_s \). If it does not, it rebroadcasts the RREQ with incremented \( \text{hops}_s \rightarrow d \) field. At the same time, \( t \) can use the received RREQ to set up a reverse route to \( s \). This route would eventually be used to forward replies back to \( s \). If \( t \) has a fresh enough route to \( d \), it replies to \( s \) (unicast via the reverse route) with a route reply (RREP) message which has the following format:

\[
\text{RREP}(d, \text{hops}_s \rightarrow d, \text{dest}_s, \text{seq}_s, \text{route}_s) .
\]

Arguments \( \text{hops}_s \rightarrow d, \text{dest}_s, \text{seq}_s, \text{route}_s \) are the corresponding attributes of \( t \)'s route to \( d \). Similarly, if \( t \) is the destination itself (\( t = d \)), it replies with

\[
\text{RREP}(0, d, \text{big}_s, \text{MY ROUTE TIMEOUT}).
\]

The value of \( \text{big}_s \) needs to be at least as big as \( d \)'s own sequence number and at least as big as \( \text{dest}_s \) from the request. Parameter \( \text{MY ROUTE TIMEOUT} \) is the default lifetime, locally configured at \( d \). Every node that receives a RREP increments the value of the \( \text{hops}_s \rightarrow d, \text{dest}_s \) packet field and forwards the packet along the reverse route to \( s \). When a node receives a RREP for some destination \( d \) it uses information from the packet to update its own route for \( d \). If it already has a route to \( d \), preference is given to the route with the bigger sequence number. If sequence numbers are the same, the shorter route is chosen. This rule is used both by \( s \) and by all of the intermediate forwarding nodes.

The above preference rule is important for propagating error messages. In addition to the routing table, each node \( s \) keeps track of the active neighbors for each destination \( d \). This is the set of neighboring nodes that use \( s \) as their \( \text{next}_d \) on the way to \( d \). If \( s \) detects that its route to \( d \) is broken, it sends an unsolicited RREP message to all of its active neighbors for \( d \). This message contains \( \text{hops}_s \rightarrow d, \text{dest}_s \) (infinity) and its \( \text{dest}_s \) is one more than the previous sequence number for that route. Such artificially incremented sequence number forces the recipients to accept this “route” and propagate it further upstream, all the way to the origin of the route.

3.2 AODV Properties

Routing protocols are often compared based on performance statistics like speed of convergence, amount of bandwidth, and memory needed for control data etc. However, the quality of the results produced by different protocols may vary. For instance, it is unfair to compare a slow routing protocol that always finds shortest routes with a really fast protocol that sometimes creates routing loops. This is why it is important to know what kind of correctness attributes a given protocol provides when comparing its performance to other protocols.

Our study focuses on analyzing correctness of AODV implementations. This can be studied from two angles: correctness with respect to the requirements and correctness with respect to the standard.

Requirements are high-level properties that a protocol is supposed to satisfy. They are usually not protocol specific, in the sense that a same requirement property usually makes sense in the context of many different protocols. A common requirement for a routing protocol is Loop Freedom: Computed routes never contain loops. It turns out that, in the case of AODV, it suffices to prove a simple invariant in order to guarantee loop freedom [5]. The loop freedom invariant is described in Table 2. Other typical routing protocol requirements are optimality of the computed routes, convergence to valid routes, etc.

A protocol standard is a document which gives basic guidelines on how to implement a protocol. Its purpose is two-fold—it ensures interoperability between different implementations and it (supposedly) ensures satisfaction of the requirements. The standard helps the implementors by describing a particular way in which the requirements are supposed to be satisfied. Since each protocol has its own standard specification, properties that describe the standard will be much more protocol-specific than the properties that describe the requirements.
The core part of a protocol standard describes what kinds of events can occur and how nodes are supposed to handle them. Network protocols usually represent reactive systems, which means that every action is carried out in response to an event. Although the standard is written in natural language, one can typically extract the state machine that it is trying to express. For example, the state machine corresponding to an AODV process is shown in Appendix B. To monitor conformance with such a state machine, we convert it to a monitoring specification that gets triggered every time a network event of interest happens. The monitoring specification attempts to keep track of the state of the protocol and checks that the events generated by the protocol are correct with respect to the state machine.

MEDL, with its explicit notion of events and its notion of explicit state transformations, proves to be a very practical language for expressing properties of network protocols. Events include, but are not limited to, packet receipts and timeouts. When an event occurs, the state of the protocol is updated and possibly new packets and timers are generated. Table 3 shows some of the properties that test adherence to the AODV standard. These properties were generated from the state machine description in Appendix B. Notice how each property contains an event in its description (denoted by a phrase of the form when... or if...). We should point out that the set of standard properties listed in Table 3 is not complete—satisfying all of the properties does not guarantee adherence to the standard. In particular, there are a number of properties about the timing of protocol events that our state machine and, consequently, our monitoring specification, does not express. It is generally not feasible to capture the whole standard as a single set of checkable properties. Size and complexity of the standard impose practical limitations on this task. Another limitation is the expressive power of the logic in which the properties are stated, as well as the complexity of checking procedures. For instance, we can only express and check safety properties, but it is conceivable that a standard may include liveness properties as well. Finally, standards sometimes prescribe implementation details whose satisfaction can not be checked by observing protocol runs. Completeness is not essential since our goal is finding errors, not showing correctness. The richer the set of properties, the more kinds of errors can be detected.

### 4 Checking AODV Simulations

In this section, we analyze AODV simulations using Verism. Verism generates a large metatrace of property violations. We use bug-repairing and tuning to discover errors in the protocol implementation.

#### 4.1 AODV properties in MEDL

Our first task is to translate properties given in Section 3.2 in MEDL. Generally, all properties are constructed to capture deviations of the observed behavior from the ideal (correct) behavior. In our framework, observable behavior of a routing protocol is the sequence of packets exchanged between the nodes. Based on the packet sequence, our MEDL property constructs the ideal system state and compares it to the observed system state. For instance, if a RREP packet heading towards a node $u$ is forwarded from node $v$ to node $w$, the observed routing table at $v$ has $\text{next}_v = w$. However, by monitoring the history of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property Name</th>
<th>Property Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monotone Sequence Numbers</td>
<td>A node’s own sequence number never decreases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination Stops</td>
<td>When a packet (RREQ, RREP or data) reaches its destination, it should not be forwarded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct Forwarding</td>
<td>If a packet addressed to $d$ (RREP or data) is forwarded, it is forwarded along the best unexpired route to $d$ seen so far.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination Reply</td>
<td>When the destination replies to a route request, the value of the hops_to_dest field of the reply should be 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node Reply</td>
<td>When a node sends a route, it sends the best unexpired route seen so far.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RREQ Sequence Number</td>
<td>When a node initiates a route request for a destination $d$, the requested sequence number should either be 0, or the last sequence number recorded for $d$ (seq_no).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detect Route Error</td>
<td>If a node detects a broken route, it should use $\text{dest}_\text{seq}_u = 1 + \text{(its own)} \text{seq}_u$ in the unsolicited RREP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Route Error</td>
<td>When a node forwards an unsolicited RREP, it should forward the same sequence number that it received.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RREP messages received at \( v \), we can see whether \( v \) was indeed expected to have such a route to \( u \).

To give an example, recall the Loop Invariant property from the previous section. Consider some three different nodes: \( at, nxt, \) and \( dst \). Assume that the node \( at \) has a route to \( dst \) through its neighbor \( nxt \):

\[
\text{next}_\text{hop}_{dst}(at) = nxt.
\]

Let \((s(at), h(at))\) be the sequence number and the hop count that node \( at \) has for the destination \( dst \) (similarly \((s(nxt), h(nxt))\) for the node \( nxt \)). The Loop Invariant property says:

\[
(s(at) \leq s(nxt)) \land (s(at) = s(nxt) \Rightarrow h(at) > h(nxt)).
\]

Therefore, the property is violated exactly when the following holds:

\[
(s(at) > s(nxt)) \lor (s(at) = s(nxt) \land h(at) \leq h(nxt)).
\]

Table 4 shows a MEDL alarm that detects this violation in the state of the nodes, as reconstructed from observed events.

The auxiliary variables: \text{best}_\text{seq}, \text{best}_\text{next}, and \text{best}_\text{hops} keep track of the sequence number, next hop, and hop count of a node’s current route to the destination \( dst \). We compare the states of nodes \( at \) and \( nxt \) to check if the loop invariant is being violated.

This will be our general strategy for translation—we first encode the ideal state machine in terms of auxiliary variables; then we convert the desired state invariants and properties of the outputs into alarms by negation. Table 5 shows AODV properties and their corresponding MEDL alarm names. Appendix A gives the complete MEDL scripts for many of these properties.

### 4.2 AODV Simulation Case Study

We consider an implementation of AODV written by the CMU Monarch Project (http://monarch.cs.cmu.edu) for the network simulator NS. This code was used primarily for performance analysis of AODV in comparison with other routing protocols for mobile, ad hoc networks [9]. In order to carry out this comparison, a number of large random scenarios were constructed as well.

The Monarch implementation is based on the first version of AODV [21] and is known to have bugs—because of incomplete specification in the standard and due to programmer errors. The code is already instrumented to produce a packet trace for every packet generated, forwarded, and dropped by the protocol. We use Verisim to analyze NS simulations of this code on a small network scenario \( S \) with five nodes, as shown in Fig. 4.

- Topology: There are five nodes initially arranged as in Fig. 4 (Phase I). Then, node 5 starts moving away from the network, causing the wireless links to break after 2.5s (Phase II). 30s into the simulation, node 5 heads back towards node 1. At 55s, it is within the range of node 4 (Phase III), at 70s it is in the range of nodes 2, 3, and 4 and, finally, it is in the range of 1, 2, and 3 (Phase IV).
- Traffic Model: Nodes 1, 2, and 3 are constant bit rate (CBR) sources for node 5. They send a total of 1,000 packets of size 512 bytes each, one packet every 0.1s.
- AODV parameters: We use the optimal AODV configuration computed by the Monarch group. The configuration involves parameters like route timeout intervals and the number of times a request should be retried.

When the AODV protocol is simulated on scenario \( S \), NS generates a trace \( T \). The initial fragment of a typical trace is shown in Table 6. When a packet send or receive event happens at a node \( N \), there is a line in the trace with the format:

\[
<\text{send/recv}> \ <\text{time}> \ _N_ \ RTR — <\text{Link Layer info}>
\]

For instance, the third line of the trace tells us that, at time 0.0, node 3 broadcasts an AODV REQUEST, for destination 5, with hop count 0, and broadcast id 1. Moreover, node 3’s current sequence number is 1 and the last sequence number it heard from the destination (5) is 0. This request eventually reaches the destination 5, through

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>MEDL alarm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monotone Sequence Numbers</td>
<td>MonSeqNo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination Stops</td>
<td>DestStops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct Forwarding</td>
<td>CorrectFwd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination Reply</td>
<td>DestRep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node Reply</td>
<td>NodeRep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RREQ Sequence Number</td>
<td>ReqSeqNo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loop Invariant</td>
<td>LoopInv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detect Route Error</td>
<td>DetectRErr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Route Error</td>
<td>FwdRErr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The last line of the trace is node 5’s REPLY to the request which it unicasts to node 3, via node 4.

### 4.3 Repair First Bug

We start with Monarch code for AODV ($P$) and simulate it using NS for the scenario $S$ to produce the trace $T$ (Table 6). Verisim then checks whether $T$ satisfies the AODV properties and produces a metatrace $T/C30$ of property violations (alarms). This metatrace generation is then repeated, on succeeding versions of $P$. Statistics on the alarms found in these metatraces are shown in Table 7. We show the results for a representative set of AODV properties. The last column in the table contains the total number of violations of all the properties (including the ones not shown). The MEDL specification for these selected AODV properties is given in Appendix A.

#### Step I.

The first metatrace $T/C30$ contains 220 alarms and the initial fragment is as shown in Table 8. This alarm trace has four DestRep alarms, 43 instances of LoopInv, 54 DetectRErr alarms, and 38 instances of NodeRep. Incidentally, the first alarm in $T/C30$ is raised at the last event of $T$ shown in Table 6. The first alarm is a DestRep at destination 5, which means that the implementation is not setting the initial hop count value in an RREP correctly. All four instances of the alarm in $T/C30$ indicate that the initial value has been set to 1. So, we go into the code and correct this simple off-by-one error, changing the initial hop count from 1 to 0. This produces a new implementation $P_1$, which we use to produce a new trace $T_1$, by running the simulation again.

#### Step II.

We run Verisim on $T_1$ and $\phi$ to produce the second metatrace $T/C30_1$. $T/C30_1$ has 216 alarms and is the same as $T/C30$ except that the DestRep alarms have been eliminated. The first alarm in the trace is a DetectRErr at node 4, where the node 4 is sending an unsolicited RREP, saying that the destination 5 is unreachable. However, the sequence number in the RREP is not one more than the best sequence number at 4. This leads us to suspect that the implementation fails to increment the sequence number at 4 before sending the unsolicited RREP. Looking at other DetectRErr alarms in the trace confirms this bug. We repair $P_1$, to eliminate this bug and produce the third version of our code, $P_2$.

#### Step III.

As before, we analyze $P_2$ through Verisim to produce $T_2$ and $T/C30_2$. $T/C30_2$ has 206 alarms, of which 44 alarms are due, LoopInv, 48 are DetectRErr alarms, and 39 are NodeRep alarms. Some of the DetectRErr alarms we detected before are gone, but a number of alarms remain. Interestingly, the NodeRep alarms and the LoopInv alarms increase by one. This is because in the old trace, when the incorrect route errors are received by nodes, the MEDL formula assumes they are ignored. However, in the new trace, the generated route errors have the correct hop count, so $\phi$ recognizes that they will be acknowledged by the recipients. This leads to more errors being recognized.

The first alarm is a NodeRep at node 3, which advertises a route with hop count 2 for the destination 5 even though it no longer has a route to the destination. It is in effect advertising outdated routes. We conclude that the conditions that check whether an RREP should be sent are buggy.

![Fig. 4. Scenario S.](image-url)
and that routes are not deleted properly in the code. Indeed
we find, when we look at the code that the RREP
generation code has multiple errors in it. We need to change three
conditional expressions in the code, to make it conform to
our properties. Finally, we again run Verisim on this new
implementation $P_3$ to produce a trace $T_3$ and metatrace $T/C_3$.

**Step IV.** The fourth metatrace just contains one alarm,
which is raised because of an unexpected buffering event at a
lower layer protocol in the simulation. Essentially, a packet $p_n$
received at node 3 is buffered at a lower layer while the
protocol responds to an older packet $p_o$. However, our MEDL
formula, which does not model lower layer protocols,
assumes that $p_n$ has already been seen and processed by the
protocol, causing the alarm. As such, $T_3$ is “correct” with
respect to the AODV properties that we modeled in MEDL.

### 4.4 Tuning

The previous section demonstrated the repair first bug
technique for bug hunting, involving new simulations every
time a bug was discovered. In this section, we demonstrate
tuning for MEDL, which allows us to discover multiple bugs
in every simulation run. We first simulate $P$ with $S$ to get $T^o$,
which is analyzed with the MEDL formula $\phi$ to get the
metatrace $T^o$. As before, we start our analysis by looking at
$T^o$. However, when we find a bug, we tune our MEDL
formula $\phi$ instead of repairing the protocol code $P$. After this
tuning, we rerun the checking part of Verisim on $T$ along
with the new MEDL formula to generate the next metatrace.
The alarm statistics for tuning are as shown in Table 9. The
MEDL script for the properties in the table is included along
with the tuning modifications in Appendix A.

**Step I.** As before, the first alarm in $T^o$ is a DestRep at
destination 5, which initializes the hop count in the RREP to 1.
This probably means that the code is initializing a node’s self-
hop count to 1 instead of 0. So, we modify the alarm DestRep
to check whether a node ever emits a hop count other than 1
(instead of 0). Then, we run Verisim on $T$ and this new MEDL
formula $\phi_1$ to get the metatrace $T^o_1$. All the DestRep alarms
disappear in the new metatrace which validates our
assumption and identifies the first bug in the code.

**Step II.** The second metatrace $T^o_1$ has 216 alarms and is
the same as $T^o$ except that the DestRep alarms no longer
appear. After looking at the metatrace, we guess that the
first alarm, DetectRErr, is because a node that discovers a
route error fails to increment the destination sequence
number. As before, we can modify the alarm DetectRErr
to ignore this case. However, according to the metatrace, route
error information still seems to propagate through the
network. This means that the implementation of the route
error packet handler must be incorrect, but in a way that
allows the route error to be propagated. So, in order to
ignore alarms related to the route error messages, we modify the
route error packet handling routine in the
MEDL formula as well. Note that, by making this
modification, we are making the MEDL formula “incor-
rect”—we are changing the ideal state so that it becomes the
same as the observed state. This change generates the third
version, $\phi_2$, which is used to produce the metatrace $T^o_2$.
Indeed, $T^o_2$ seems to not have the kinds of DetectRErr
alarms and follow-up alarms as noticed before.

**Step III.** $T^o_2$ has 166 alarms, of which 50 are LoopInv
alarms and 38 are NodeRep alarms. Both DestRep and
DetectRErr have been eliminated. Observe that the LoopInv
alerts have increased because the modified MEDL state allows more alarms to be identified. As before, we look at the metatrace and conclude that the way replies are generated in the protocol code is incorrect. In particular, even when a node has lost a route, it keeps its hop count around and when an RREQ is received, it incorrectly replies as if it has a route. We imitate this behavior by changing the MEDL formula to assume the same by allowing hop counts to stay even after the route has been lost. We run Verisim on this formula \( \phi_3 \) and generate the fourth metatrace \( T^{\phi_3} \).

**Step IV.** The new metatrace \( T^{\phi_3} \) still has 30 alarms, with 21 NodeRep alarms that are difficult to interpret. Essentially, at this point, too much information has been filtered out of the trace to make any good guesses about the origin of the errors. So, we go back to the code to repair the three bugs detected above. When we look at the code for the RREP generation, we realize that the implementation has multiple bugs causing it to behave highly unexpectedly. These bugs explain the alarms remaining in \( T^{\phi_3} \).

We repair \( P \) to produce a new implementation \( P_f \), which is analyzed through Verisim to produce \( T_f \). \( T_f \) has a total of one alarm due to a packet buffering event at a node.

### 4.5 Analysis

We discovered three errors in the AODV implementation, which altogether required rewriting 18 lines of the Monarch code. Of these, the RREP generation problem is particularly interesting. This error causes the AODV implementation to actually form loops, which we detected in our simulation. In general, loop formation is difficult to detect by other analyses. Indeed, our previous manual analyses of AODV simulations failed to detect the existence of loop or the RREP generation bugs that cause it. The automation provided by Verisim was crucial to detect and wade through property violations in the simulation.

It must be emphasized that the intuition that allows one to tune MEDL formulas is highly protocol specific. One must have a good understanding of the protocol and conduct a manual analysis of the metatrace before the faults that caused the errors can be guessed. It is often the case that there are several useful ways to tune a formula. We have demonstrated that Verisim is flexible enough to allow our guesses to be validated without even rerunning the simulation, let alone looking at or modifying the code.

### 5 Abstractions and “Off-the-Shelf” Simulations

In order to see how well our techniques scale up to simulations usually analyzed to measure the performance of a network protocol, we applied our techniques to the largest trace made available by the CMU Monarch group [9]. This “Off-The-Shelf” (OTS) trace was generated by AODV simulation on a site of size 1,500 × 300 meters with 50 nodes constantly moving at 20 meters per second. There were 150 data connections transmitting four 64 byte packets every second. The simulation and our Verisim analyses of the trace were carried out on a dual Pentium-III 550Mhz Xeon processors machine with one gigabyte of memory. The OS was Red Hat Linux 6.1 with the 2.2.12-20 SMP Kernel. We used NS version 2.1b1 and MACSware 0.99 implemented in IBM JDK 1.1.8 for Linux and running on the JVM. The NS simulation itself required about 5220 seconds to complete and generated 6,446,316 events. This is much larger than the traces analyzed by Verisim in the previous section, which all had less than 10,000 events. A naive effort to use Verisim to analyze MonSeqNo, a relatively simple property, on this trace was prohibitively time consuming. We estimate that the time required to check the desired relationship after each of 6,446,316 events between each pair of nodes (2,500 relations) to be more than 100 days based on extrapolating a four-day run of the analysis. On the bright side, errors with MonSeqNo were detected in the first four days of analysis. More significantly, there are a number of optimizations that will find an error with considerably less effort. The results of analyzing the OTS simulation with various optimizations for the MonSeqNo (called \( \mu \)) property are given in Table 10. Two additional optimizations were tested on the LoopInv (called \( \lambda \)) property and these results are provided in Table 11. The OTS trace is called \( T \) in the tables. The naive analysis is Experiment A, recorded in the first line of Table 10.

The experiments measure the effects of various abstractions that one may perform on either the trace or the property to make the analysis feasible, while also finding errors in the code. There were two abstractions that we chose to apply: population abstraction and packet-type abstraction. Population abstraction focuses only on a small set of nodes, while ignoring the others. We can apply this abstraction to either the property being tested or to the trace. For example, when applied to the property MonSeqNo, it would mean that we check that only certain nodes satisfy the MonSeqNo property. When we apply this to the trace, we prune the trace to consist of only events sent or received by these nodes. In our case study, we looked at two population abstractions. In one, we focused on packets at nodes 6 through 10 for the destinations 6 through 10 (25 relations). We call this \( \pi \). In the other population abstraction, called \( \pi' \), we also considered only packets at nodes 6 through 10, but we let the destination be any of the 50 nodes (250 relations). The result of applying the population abstraction \( \pi \) to a formula \( \phi \) is denoted by \( F_{\pi}(\phi) \). When the population abstraction is applied to a trace \( T \), we denote it by \( P_{\pi}(T) \). Population abstraction is applied to either the property or the trace in Experiments B, D, E, F, G, H, I of Tables 10 and 11.

In packet-type abstraction, we prune the trace to include only events that directly affect the property we are
TABLE 10
Results of MonSeqNo Property on Trace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exp</th>
<th>Trace [# of events]</th>
<th>Property size in bytes</th>
<th>Time (in secs)</th>
<th>Rate (time/events/prop)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>T [6,446,316]</td>
<td>μ [1,476,638]</td>
<td>&gt; 4 days</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>T [6,446,316]</td>
<td>F_{σ}(μ) [14,543]</td>
<td>51,045</td>
<td>0.54μs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>E_{σ}(T) [706,753]</td>
<td>μ [1,476,638]</td>
<td>&gt; 4 days</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>E_{σ}(T) [706,753]</td>
<td>F_{σ}(μ) [14,543]</td>
<td>5,440</td>
<td>0.53μs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>P_{σ}(T) [641,253]</td>
<td>F_{P}(σF) [145,178]</td>
<td>85,012</td>
<td>0.93μs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>P_{σ}(T) [60,411]</td>
<td>F_{P}(σF) [14,543]</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>0.59μs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>E_{σ}(P_{σ}(T))</td>
<td>F_{σ}(μ) [14,543]</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.55μs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 11
Results of LoopInv Property on Trace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exp</th>
<th>Trace [# of events]</th>
<th>Property size in bytes</th>
<th>Time (in secs)</th>
<th>Rate (time/events/prop)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>P_{σ}(T) [60,411]</td>
<td>P_{σ}(λ) [75,508]</td>
<td>8064</td>
<td>1.54μs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>E_{σ}(P_{σ}(T))</td>
<td>P_{σ}(λ) [75,508]</td>
<td>5912</td>
<td>1.61μs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

interested in. For example, for the MonSeqNo property, this abstraction (denoted by \( E_{σ} \)) when applied to the trace, removes all events except for the \( \text{sendroute} \{\text{at} \} \{\text{dist} \} \) event. The corresponding abstraction for the oopInv property (denoted by \( E_{σ} \)), removes a different set of events from the trace. In experiments C, D, G, and I a packet type abstraction was applied.

It is important to make the distinction between population abstractions and packet-type abstractions. These two classes of abstractions have essential differences that one needs to be aware of when interpreting results of the abstracted simulations. Packet-type abstractions, if applied properly, are complete. This means that all errors from the original trace will still exist in the abstracted trace. Because of this, it is generally always useful to perform packet-type abstractions. They will, more than likely, improve the performance, while producing the same result as checking the original trace. In contrast, population abstractions can miss errors. This can happen if an error occurs outside the observed population. However, this is not very likely to happen with network protocols where all nodes run identical processes. Generally, both population abstractions and packet-type abstractions are sound—every error present in the abstracted simulation indicates an error in the original simulation. Formally, if we use the notation \( T \models \varphi \) to indicate that a trace \( T \) satisfies a formula \( \varphi \), the following will hold for every event-type abstraction \( \pi \) and a population abstraction \( \sigma \):

\[
T \models \varphi \iff E_{\pi}(T) \models \varphi \\
T \models \varphi \iff P_{\sigma}(T) \models \varphi \\
T \models \varphi \iff T \models F_{\sigma}(\varphi)
\]

Our case study revealed two things: linear growth in complexity and significant benefits from abstractions. First, the time taken to process the trace depends only linearly on the length of the trace and the size of the formula; this can be seen from the fact that the last column of our tables is nearly constant. The reason why the rates in Table 11 are three times more than those in Table 10 is because the property of LoopInv is more complicated and has three alternations between \& and | . Second, abstractions can significantly improve the time taken in performing the analysis. For example, after applying both population and packet type abstractions, the time for the analysis went from more than four days (Experiment A) to 51 seconds (Experiment G). Moreover, this optimization did not excessively compromise our ability to discover bugs in the trace: The alarms associated with nodes 6 to 10 that would have been generated had we analyzed the entire trace are still generated when we test the much smaller trace we get after applying the abstractions.

6 RELATED WORK

While there has been a great deal of research on the formal verification of communication systems, these efforts have generally been limited in two respects. First, they generally prove properties of the protocol and, therefore, may not be helpful in finding problems in protocol implementations. Second, few efforts have focused on multiparty protocols like routing, where proving a property of a fixed number of routers limits the scope of the proof drastically. [15] describes a method for studying behavior of multiparty protocols (such as PIM-SM) in “stressful” conditions. (See reference [5] for a general discussion of verifying routing protocols.) These two problems are partially addressed by the Verisim strategy of analyzing trace runs from simulations. First, the simulation code is closer to the implementation code and, therefore, the Verisim tests are more likely to reveal problems with the deployed system. Second, the ease of creating simulations makes it possible to test a large variety of configurations, thus partially addressing the problem that all configurations cannot be tested. In any event, Verisim analysis is complementary to both static and dynamic analysis, so it can be useful as long as it is convenient. Integration with NS contributes to this objective since simulations created for other reasons like performance analysis can easily be subjected to Verisim analysis as well.

A large body of related research work concentrates on automated generation of test oracles from the requirements. A general methodology for doing this is discussed in [24], together with examples in Real Time Interval Logic (RTIL) and Z. Papers [7], [6], [8] describe a trace analysis tool for
LOTOS requirements, while [12] describes a similar tool for Estelle requirements. Generating test oracles for Graphical Interval Logic (GIL) is discussed in [11], [20]. An equivalent problem for a safe fragment of Linear Temporal Logic is

```medl
ReqSpec AODVSPEC

/* imported events: packet fields */
import event atnode, fordest, src, src_seq, src hc, dest, dest_seq, bcastid;
import event prev, next_hop, init, eventty, pktty, pkt_rcv;

/* state variables for each pair of nodes */
var int best seq[at][dst], best hc[at][dst], best_next[at][dst];

/* packet with routing information is detected */
event routeinfo[at][dst] = pkt_rcv when
  ((value(atnode) == at) && (value(src) == dst) && (value(pktty) > 0))
/* packet with routing information is received by node at */
event recvroute[at][dst] = routeinfo[at][dst] when ((value(eventty) == 0) && (value(src) == dst) && (value(src) < 255));
/* a better route is received by node at */
event recvbetter[at][dst] = recvroute[at][dst]
  when ((value(src_seq) > best_seq[at][dst]) ||
  ((value(src_seq) == best_seq[at][dst]) && (value(src) < best hc[at][dst])));
/* route error received */
event recverr[at][dst] = routeinfo[at][dst] when ((value(eventty) == 0) && (value(pktty) == 2) && (value(src) >= 255));
/* received route error means that route is broken */
event recvbettererr[at][dst] = recverr[at][dst] when
  (value(src_seq) > best_seq[at][dst]);
/* packet with routing information is sent by node at */
event sendroute[at][dst] = routeinfo[at][dst] when ((value(eventty) == 1) && (value(src) < 255));
/* route error sent */
event senderr[at][dst] = routeinfo[at][dst] when ((value(eventty) == 1) && (value(pktty) == 2) && (value(src) >= 255))
/* initial route error packet is sent by node at */
event sendiniterr[at][dst] = senderr[at][dst]
  when (best hc[at][dst] < 255);
/* increased sequence number is sent by destination dst */
event sendincseq[at][dst] = sendroute[at][dst]
  when ((dst == at) && (value(src_seq) > best_seq[at][at]));
/* Alarm: sequence number sent by a node has decreased */
alarm MonSeqNo[at][dst] = sendroute[at][dst]
  when ((dst == at) && (value(src_seq) < best_seq[at][at]));
/* Alarm: destination's reply has wrong hop count */
alarm DestRep[at][dst] = sendroute[at][dst] when
  ((dst == at) && (value(src) > 0));
```

Fig. 5. Complete MEDL script.
discussed in [16]. This fragment is expressively similar to the requirements language of Verisim. However, an important feature that distinguishes Verisim from most of the above work is its focus on integration of simulation and testing. Another toolset that follows this idea is the simulation and monitoring platform MTSim [10], based on

Fig. 6. Complete MEDL script (cont.).
the graphical real-time specification language Modechart. An advantage of Verisim is that instead of using formal models, it uses off-the-shelf network simulators already designed for prototyping, performance evaluation, and other purposes.

There is similarity between Verisim formal analysis of protocol simulations and network Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS's). IDS's aim to detect anomalies in network traffic to enable operators to discover problems or trigger automated responses. Examples include Next-generation Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES) [2], which performs both statistical analysis and rule-based signature analysis on audit records and Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD) [23], which detects malicious activity through and across large networks. Although IDS's often focus on detecting statistical anomalies like unusual volumes of certain kinds of traffic, at least some are able to check properties of the kind we describe in MEDL. Although we are not aware of any efforts to do so, such systems could perhaps be used in the way we have used Verisim to produce metatraces as a debugging aid for analyzing simulations. For instance, the rule-based analysis language (P-BEST language) [19] used in [2], [23] is as expressive as MEDL.

| TABLE 12 | ADOV State Machine with No Route |
|---|---|---|
| **STATE:** No Route | **Action** | **Next State** |
| **Condition** | | |
| TimeOut | seq.no ← 0 | No Route |
| Recv from p: | RREQ(d, hops.to.src, dest.seq.no, src.seq.no) | dest.seq.no ← max(seq.no, dest.seq.no); Broadcast RREQ(d, hops.to.src + 1, dest.seq.no, src.seq.no); |
| ∧ d = dst | | No Route |
| Recv from p: | RREQ(d, hops.to.src, dest.seq.no, src.seq.no) | next_hop ← p; hop_cnt ← hops.to.src + 1; |
| ∧ s = dst ∧ src_seq.no ≥ seq_no | seq_no ← src_seq.no; | lifetime ← REV_ROUTE.LIFE; |
| Recv from p: | RREP(hops.to.dest, d, dest.seq.no, route_lifetime) | next_hop ← p; hop_cnt ← hops.to.dest + 1; |
| ∧ d = dst ∧ dest_seq.no > seq_no | seq_no ← dest_seq.no; | lifetime ← route_lifetime |

| TABLE 13 | ADOV Machine with Route |
|---|---|---|
| **STATE:** Has Route | **Action** | **Next State** |
| **Condition** | | |
| TimeOut | seq.no ← seq.no + 1; next_hop ← 0; hop_cnt ← 255 Send to active neighbors: RREP(255, dst, seq.no, BAD_LINK.LIFETIME) | No Route |
| Recv from p: | RREQ(d, hops.to.src, dest.seq.no, src.seq.no) | next_hop ← p; hop_cnt ← hops.to.src + 1; |
| ∧ s = dst | seq_no ← src_seq.no; | lifetime ← REV_ROUTE.LIFE |
| ∧ [src_seq.no, hops.to.src] is better than [seq_no, hop_cnt] | | |
| Recv from p: | RREP(hops.to.dest, d, dest.seq.no, route_lifetime) | next_hop ← p; hops.to.dest + 1; |
| ∧ d = dst | seq_no ← dest_seq.no; | lifetime ← route_lifetime |
| ∧ [dest_seq.no, hops.to.dest] is better than [seq_no, hop_cnt] | | |
| Recv from p: | RREP(255, d, dest.seq.no, route_lifetime) | next_hop ← 0; hop_cnt ← 255; |
| ∧ d = dst | seq_no ← dest_seq.no; | lifetime ← BAD_LINK.LIFETIME |
| ∧ dest_seq.no > seq_no | | |
| Recv from p: | RREQ(d, hops.to.src, dest.seq.no, src.seq.no) | Unicast from me for s : RREP(hop_cnt, d, seq.no, MY_ROUTE.TIMEOUT) | Has Route |
| ∧ d = dst ∧ dest_seq.no ≤ seq_no | | |
| Recv unicast from p for dst: DATA | Send to next_hop : DATA | Has Route |
| Recv unicast from p for dst: | RREP(hops.to.dest + 1, d, dest_seq.no, route_lifetime) | Has Route |

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Additional information about related work can be obtained from [4], which describes a taxonomy for logical analysis of networks and uses this to classify some of the literature. A survey of tools used in the Verinet project (including Verisim) can be found in [3].

7 Conclusion

We have demonstrated an integrated system called Verisim consisting of a network simulator and a logic-based checker for traces of events. This combination provides a flexible approach to studying correctness properties of network simulations. We have shown the usefulness of the tool by demonstrating how it can find flaws in nontrivial simulator code. We have also shown how its flexibility can be exploited through the concept of tuning to improve the turn-around time in debugging. We believe that the approach is practical and scalable and can be used as a productive adjunct to standard network protocol engineering practices.

Appendix A

The MEDL Specification of AODV Properties

To illustrate the use of MEDL in specification of AODV properties, we show a complete MEDL script that contains all the properties that are discussed in the paper. (See Figs. 5 and 6.) These are the MonSeqNo, DestRep, DetectRerr, NodeRep, and LoopInv properties.

Appendix A.1

Tuning

Step I We change DestRep as follows:

\[
\text{alarm DestRep} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] = \text{sendroute} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] \ \text{when} \ ((\text{dst}==\text{at}) \ && \ (\text{value(src_seq,0)} != 1))
\]

Step II We change the DetectRerr alarm and the event-handling conditions for route error packets as follows:

\[
\text{alarm DetectRerr} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] = \text{senderr} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] \ \text{when} \ ((\text{best_hc} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] < 255) \ && \ (\text{value(src_seq,0)} != \text{best_seq} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}])))
\]

\[
\text{event recvbettererr} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] = \text{recvrr} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] \ \text{when} \ (\text{value(prev,0)} == \text{best_next} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}])
\]

Step III We change the state machine as follows:

\[
\text{sendiniterr} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] \to \{ \ \text{best_seq} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] = \text{value(src_seq,0)}; \ 
\text{best_next} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}]' = 0; \ 
\}
\]

\[
\text{recvbettererr} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] \to \{ \ \text{best_seq} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] = \text{value(src_seq,0)}; \ 
\text{best_next} \ [\text{at}] \ [\text{dst}] = 0; \ 
\}
\]

Appendix B

The AODV State Machine

The AODV Specification [21] is an evolving document published by the MANET working group at the IETF (http://www.ietf.org). The document describes the various packets and network events that an AODV process needs to respond to. Here, we present the reactive state machine that an implementation of AODV version 0 is supposed to implement. There are two control states corresponding to the presence or absence of a route to the destination. In addition, for each destination AODV keeps track of the best known route: seq_no, hops_cnt, next_hop, and lifetime. An AODV node runs a state machine for each destination; the state machine for the destination dst is shown in Tables 12 and 13. We have left out some details of timeouts and link error events, which the protocol needs to handle as well. The state machine presented here captures the major packet events and their relation to the state at an AODV process.

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References


Karthikeyan Bhargavan received the BTech degree in computer science and engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology, New Delhi, in May 1997. He received the MS degree in computer science in December 1998. Since Fall 1997, he has been enrolled in the PhD program at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. His research interests is on formal methods, programming languages and the analysis of networking software. He is currently investigating the application of light-weight formal methods to network protocol monitoring, as his thesis research.

Carl A. Gunter received the PhD degree from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1985. After working as a research associate at Carnegie Mellon University and Cambridge University he joined the faculty at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia in 1987, where he is currently a professor in the Department of Computer and Information Science. He does research in the areas of security, networks, programming languages, and software engineering. He is the author of more than 80 research papers on these topics, as well as a graduate textbook on the semantics of programming languages, and software engineering, and the coeditor of a book on the theory of object-oriented languages. He is a senior member of the IEEE.

Moonjoo Kim received the BS degree in computer science from the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology in 1995, and the PhD degree in computer and information science from the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia in 2001. His research activities included formal methods, embedded real-time systems, and runtime software analysis. His current research interest is on secure network design and analysis. He is currently a technical staff member at SECUl.com located in Seoul, Korea.

Insup Lee received the BS degree in mathematics from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, in 1977, and the PhD degree in computer science from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, in 1983. He is currently a professor in the Department of Computer and Information Science at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, where he has been since 1983. His research interests include the specification and analysis of time dependent systems, the semantics and implementation of real-time programming languages, software engineering methods and tools, and operating systems. He was the cochair of the Program Committee for the 1992 IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium, and is the general cochair for the 1993 IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium. He is a fellow of the IEEE.

Davor Obradovic received the Bachelors degree in mathematics in 1996 from the University of Zagreb, Croatia. From 1996 to 2001, he has been enrolled in the PhD program in computer science at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia with Carl A. Gunter as his advisor. His thesis work was about formal analysis of network protocols. Currently, he works at the Quantitative Research Department of Susquehanna International Group.

Oleg Sokolsky received the MSc degree in computer science from St. Petersburg Technical University (Russia), in 1988, and the PhD degree in computer science from the State University of New York at Stonybrook. He is a research assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, where he has occupied research staff positions since 1998. His research interests include formal methods for the analysis of real-time and hybrid systems, model checking, and runtime verification.

Mahesh Viswanathan received the Bachelor of Technology degree in computer science from the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, India, and the PhD degree from the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. He was a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Discrete Mathematics and Computer Science during the academic year of 2000-01, and is currently an assistant professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.