

# Automated Analysis of Industrial Embedded Software

**Moonzoo Kim** and Yunho Kim

Provable Software Lab

KAIST, South Korea


The logo for KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology) is displayed in a bold, blue, sans-serif font. Below the text is a light blue horizontal oval shape.

Thanks to Hotae Kim and Yoonkyu Jang


Samsung Electronics, South Korea

The Samsung logo is shown in white, uppercase letters inside a dark blue, horizontally-oriented oval.

# Strong IT Industry in South Korea




**KIA MOTORS**




# Personal Research Roadmap



## ✚ Past: RV (dynamic) & MC (static)



## ✚ Current: Extended Concolic Testing




## ✚ Future: Concolic Testing with Intelligence



# Part I: Experience from SW Model Checking

Target system: Samsung Unified Storage Platform (USP) for OneNAND<sup>®</sup> flash memory (around 30K lines of C code)

- ▶ Characteristics of OneNAND<sup>®</sup> flash mem
  - ▶ Each memory cell can be written limited number of times only
    - ▶ **Logical-to-physical sector mapping**
    - ▶ Bad block management, wear-leveling, etc
  - ▶ Concurrent I/O operations
    - ▶ **Synchronization** among processes is crucial
  - ▶ XIP by emulating NOR interface through demand-paging scheme
    - ▶ **binary execution has a highest priority**
  - ▶ Performance enhancement
    - ▶ **Multi-sector read/write**
    - ▶ Asynchronous operations
    - ▶ Deferred operation result check






# Results of Unit Analysis through CBMC and BLAST [TSE'11]

---


- ▶ Demand paging manager (234 LOC)
  - ▶ Detected a bug of not saving the status of suspended erase operation
- ▶ Concurrency handling
  - ▶ Confirmed that the BML semaphore was used correctly in all 14 BML functions (150 LOC on average)
  - ▶ Detected a bug of ignoring BML semaphore exceptions in a call sequence from STL (2500 LOC on average)
- ▶ Multi-sector read operation (MSR) (157 LOC)
  - ▶ Provided high assurance on the correctness of MSR
    - ▶ no violation was detected even after exhaustive analysis (at least with a small number of physical units(~10))
- ▶ In addition, we evaluated and compared pros and cons of CBMC and BLAST empirically

# Logical to Physical Sector Mapping



▶ In flash memory, logical data are distributed over physical sectors.

# Multi-sector Read Operation (MSR)



- ▶ MSR reads adjacent multiple physical sectors once in order to improve read speed
  - ▶ MSR is 157 lines long, but highly complex due to its 4 level loops
  - ▶ 4 parameters to specify logical data to read (from, to, how long, read flag )
- ▶ The requirement property is to check
  - ▶ after\_MSR -> ( $\forall i. \text{logical\_sectors}[i] == \text{buf}[i]$ )
- ▶ We built a **verification environment model** for MSR

# Environment Modeling

1. **One PU is mapped to at most one LU**
2. **Valid correspondence between SAMs and PUs:**

If the  $i$  th LS is written in the  $k$  th sector of the  $j$  th PU, then the  $i$  th offset of the  $j$  th SAM is valid and indicates the  $k$ 'th PS ,

Ex>            3<sup>rd</sup> LS ('C') is in the 3<sup>rd</sup> sector of the 2<sup>nd</sup> PU, then SAM1[2] ==2  
                   i=2                                    k=2                                    j=1

3. **For one LS, there exists only one PS that contains the value of the LS:**

The PS number of the  $i$  th LS must be written in only one of the  $(i \bmod 4)$  th offsets of the SAM tables for the PUs mapped to the corresponding LU.

$$\forall i, j, k (LS[i] = PU[j].sect[k] \rightarrow (SAM[j].valid[i \bmod m] = true$$

$$\& SAM[j].offset[i \bmod m] = k$$

$$\& \forall p. (SAM[p].valid[i \bmod m] = false)$$


$$\text{where } p \neq j \text{ and } PU[p] \text{ is mapped to } \lfloor \frac{i}{m} \rfloor \text{th } LU))$$

	SAM0~SAM4				PU0~PU4			
Sector 0	1		0				E	
Sector 1		1		1	A	B		F
Sector 2		2				C		
Sector 3			3				D	



# Model Checking Results of MSR [Spin'08]

- ▶ Verification of MSR by using NuSMV, Spin, and CBMC
- ▶ No violation was detected within  $|LS| \leq 8$ ,  $|PU| \leq 10$ 
  - ▶  $10^{10}$  configurations were exhaustively analyzed for  $|LS|=8$ ,  $|PU|=10$



# Feedbacks from Samsung Electronics

---

## Main challenge :

- IT industry is not mature enough to conduct unit testing

1. Current SW development of Samsung is not ready to apply unit testing
  - ▶ Tight project deadline does not allow defining detailed asserts and environment models
2. Needs large scalability even at the cost of accuracy
  - ▶ Rigorous automated tools for small unit (i.e., SW model checker) is of limited practical value
3. Many embedded SW components have dependency on external libraries
  - ▶ Pure analysis methods on source code only are of limited value
4. It is desirable to generate test cases as a result of the analysis.
  - ▶ Current SW V&V practice operates on test cases

# Background on Concolic Testing

---

- ▶ **Concrete** runtime execution guides **symbolic** path analysis
  - ▶ a.k.a. dynamic symbolic execution (DSE), white-box fuzzing
- ▶ **Automated test case (TC) generation technique**
  - ▶ Applicable to a large target program (no memory bottleneck)
  - ▶ Applicable to testing stages seamlessly
  - ▶ External binary library can be handled (partially)
- ▶ **Explicit path model checker**
  - ▶ All possible execution paths are explored based on the generated TCs
  - ▶ Anytime algorithm
    - ▶ User can get partial analysis result (i.e., TCs) anytime
  - ▶ Analysis of each path is independent from each other
    - ▶ Parallelization for linear speed up
    - ▶ Ex. Scalable Concolic testing for Reliable Embedded Software (SCORE) on thousands of Amazon EC2 cloud computing nodes [FSE'11b]

# Part II: Experience from Concolic Testing using CREST

---

Target system: Samsung Smartphone Platform

## ▶ Unit-level testing

1. Busybox ls (1100 LOC)
  - ▶ 98% of branches covered and 4 bugs detected
2. Samsung security library (2300 LOC)
  - ▶ 73% of branches covered and a memory violation bug detected


## ▶ System level testing

1. Samsung Linux Platform (SLP) file manager
  - ▶ Covered 20% of the branches and detected an infinite loop bug
2. 10 Busybox utilities
  - ▶ Covered 80% of the branches with 4 different search strategy and 10,000 TCs in 20 min each
  - ▶ A buffer overflow bug in grep was detected
3. Libexif
  - ▶ Covered 43% of the branches with 4 different search strategy and 10,000 TCs in 8 hours each
  - ▶ 2 null pointer dereferences and 5 divide-by-0 bugs were detected

# Samsung Security Library [FSE'11a]

---

- ▶ Providing complete security protocol APIs
- ▶ 3 level layered structure
- ▶ Complex mathematical operation involved



- ▶ We targeted the large integer functions layer using the CREST tool
  - ▶ Upper 2 layers heavily use external math library functions and are hard to understand due to complex algorithms

# Symbolic Inputs

---

- ▶ All 14 functions in the large integer functions layer receive struct L\_INT as inputs
- ▶ struct L\_INT {  
    unsigned int size; // Allocated memory size in 32 bits  
    unsigned int len; // # of valid 32 bit elements, thus **len <= size**  
    unsigned int \*da; // Actual data, da[len-1] are the most-significant bytes  
    unsigned int sign; // 0: non-negative, 1: negative  
}

- ▶ Ex. 4294967298 ( $=2*2^0 + 1*2^{32}$ ) is represented by

```
unsigned int size=3;  
unsigned int len=2;  
unsigned int *da = {2,1,0}; //  $2*2^0 + 1*2^{32} + 0*2^{64}$   
unsigned int sign=0;
```

da[0]	da[1]	da[2]
2	1	0

# Symbolic L\_INT Generator

---

- ▶ `gen_s_int()` generates symbolic L\_INT whose size is between min and max
  - ▶ Allocate memory of L\_INT with symbolic size of data buffer (line 2~6)
  - ▶ Fill L\_INT data when `to_fill` is not 0 (line 8~12)

```
01: L_INT* gen_s_int(int min,int max,int to_fill) {
02:     unsigned int size, i;
03:     CREST_unsigned_int(size); //sym. var.
04:     if(size> max || size< min) exit(0);
05:     L_INT *n=L_INT_Init(size);
06:     n->len=size;
07:
08:     if(to_fill){// sym. value assignment
09:         for(i=0; i < size; i++) {
10:             CREST_unsigned_int(n->da[i]);}
11:         if(n->da[size-1]==0) exit(0); }
12:     return n;}
```

# Test Driver for L\_INT\_ModAdd()

---

- ▶ L\_INT\_ModAdd(dest, n1, n2, m)
  - ▶ dest := (n1+n2)%m // (6+7)% 10 = 3
- ▶ Check (n1+n2)%m == (n2+n1)%m (line 11)
  - ▶ Generate 3 symbolic L\_INT operands for n1, n2, and m (line 2~4)
  - ▶ Generate 2 symbolic L\_INT dest and dest2 to store the results

```
01: void test_L_INT_ModAdd() {
02:     L_INT *n1 = gen_s_int(1,4,1),
03:         *n2 = gen_s_int(1,4,1),
04:         *m = gen_s_int(1,4,1),
05:         *dest = gen_s_int(1,4,0), // Do not fill *da
06:         *dest2 = gen_s_int(1,4,0); // Do not fill *da
07:
08:     L_INT_ModAdd(dest, n1, n2, m);
09:     L_INT_ModAdd(dest2, n2, n1, m);
10:     // (n1+n2)%m == (n2+n1)%m
11:     assert(L_INT_Cmp(dest, dest2) == 0); }
```



# Results

- ▶ We tested all 14 functions and all of them violated assertions
  - ▶ 7537 TCs generated in 5 mins
  - ▶ 1284/1953 branches covered(73.2%)
- ▶ L\_INT\_ModAdd()
  - ▶ 831 TCs generated
  - ▶ 129 among 150 branches covered (86%)
  - ▶ 17 violations of assert (dest == dest2)

## Correct behavior

```
----- Test input -----  
n1 : 2 :7f7d4b02 6b702b0d  
n2 : 1 :3787923c  
m: 1 :777d0295  
dest.size=1  
dest2.size=1  
-----Test output -----  
dest: 1 :539b103d  
dest2: 1 :539b103d  
L_INT_Cmp(dest,dest2)==0
```

## Violation of assert(dest1=dest2)

```
----- Test input -----  
n1 : 4 :777d0295 3787923c 7f7d4b02 6b702b0d  
n2 : 3 :513a3234 7d0b4f12 5789fd36  
m: 3 :08cae318 61d52574 73331ffa  
dest.size=1  
dest2.size=1  
-----Test output -----  
dest: 3 :00000001 dc5f0f9e a0862e99  
dest2: 3 :0874a808 dc5f0f9e a0862e99  
L_INT_Cmp(dest,dest2)==-1  
test_L_INT_ModAdd:Assertion `result == 0' failed.
```

# Observations from these Verification Projects

---

## Main challenge:

- State space explosion problem

1. Expensive computational cost
  - ▶ Huge state space (  $|TCs| = \sim 2^{|\text{exec}|}$  . )
  - ▶ ~90% of time spent by a SMT solver
    - ▶ SMT solvers seem good at solving a complex formula but not good at solving millions of similar short formulas
2. Proper selection of symbolic input to reduce state space
  - ▶ requires deep knowledge of a target program
3. Build process and runtime environment dependence causes additional burden

## Conclusion and Future Work

---

- ▶ Formal verification techniques really work in IT industry !
  - ▶ Software model checking and concolic testing detected hidden bugs in industrial embedded software
- ▶ To alleviate the limitations of concolic testing
  - ▶ Fault-tolerance for distributed concolic testing (SCORE framework [FSE'11b])
  - ▶ External function summaries through dynamic invariance generation
  - ▶ Develop a new search strategy for fast branch coverage
- ▶ Data mining on a huge set of runtime execution information
  - ▶ Automated oracle generation through dynamic invariant generation
  - ▶ Automated debugging
- ▶ Technical papers can be downloaded at <http://pswlab.kaist.ac.kr>